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Abstract—In recent years we have witnessed a shift towards
personalized, context-based applications and services for mobile
device users. A key component of many of these services is the
ability to infer the current location and predict the future location
of users based on location sensors embedded in the devices.
Such knowledge enables service providers to present relevant and
timely offers to their users and better manage traffic congestion
control, thus increasing customer satisfaction and engagement.
However, such services suffer from location data leakage which
has become one of today’s most concerning privacy issues for
smartphone users. In this paper we focus specifically on location
data that is exposed by Android applications via Internet network
traffic in plaintext (i.e., without encryption) without the user’s
awareness. We present an empirical evaluation, involving the
network traffic of real mobile device users, aimed at: (1) mea-
suring the extent of location data leakage in the Internet traffic
of Android-based smartphone devices; and (2) understanding the
value of this data by inferring users’ points of interests (POIs).
This was achieved by analyzing the Internet traffic recorded from
the smartphones of a group of 71 participants for an average
period of 37 days. We also propose a procedure for mining
and filtering location data from raw network traffic and utilize
geolocation clustering methods to infer users’ POIs. The key
findings of this research center on the extent of this phenomenon
in terms of both ubiquity and severity; we found that over 85%
of devices of users are leaking location data, and the exposure
rate of users’ POIs, derived from the relatively sparse leakage
indicators, is around 61%.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a trend towards the person-
alization of services in many areas. This is particularly true
for services provided on mobile devices, where a plethora of
context-based applications (for example, Yelp, Uber, Google
Maps, and Google Now) are used daily by millions of people.
These devices possess a tremendous amount of private infor-
mation, ranging from users’ personal and financial data to their
location data, making such devices the target of commercial
entities and intelligence gathering. A key property of many
of these services is the ability to understand the users’ current
location, infer points of interest, and predict the future location
of users based on location sensors embedded in the devices.
Such knowledge enables service providers to present relevant
and timely services (such as navigation recommendations,
weather forecasts, advertisements, social networks, etc.) to
their users, thus increasing customer satisfaction and engage-
ment. Methods for deriving the location of a mobile device
can be categorized into the following two approaches:
• Host-based: In this approach, an installed application
can infer the location of the device by probing built-in
sensors or evaluating data provided when a user checks
in to a place on social media. Local sensors that can
provide location data include hotspot (Wi-Fi) information
such as the SSID and BSSID [1], connected cellular, as
well as GPS [2]. The location can also be inferred by
using various side-channel attacks such as power supply
variance analysis [3].
• Network-based: In this approach, the location of the
mobile device can be derived by using cell tower tri-
angulation [4] (i.e., using radio-location by analyzing
signals received by the cell towers the device is connected
to). This requires high privileged access to the data,
which is usually available to service providers and law
enforcement agencies.
In order to utilize location traces as a meaningful informa-
tion source, it is imperative to analyze the data and aggregate
it to location clusters that are important to the user, such as
home, shopping, or work [2]. These locations are also known
as the users’ points of interest (POIs). The most common
approach for inferring a user’s POIs from location traces is by
clustering the location traces by distance and time thresholds;
eventually, a cluster will be produced if the user has stayed
in the same place for a sufficient amount of time. POIs are
identified by understanding which clusters are important to
the user and omitting less important data such as transit data
[5][6].
Location data collected on the host (mobile device) may
be provided to third party services by applications or leaked
by a malicious application [7]. Recent works have reported a
high rate of personal data leakage by popular applications over
insecure communication channels without users’ awareness.
These studies also showed that location data is one of the most
”popular” leaked personally identifiable information (PII), as
10% of the most popular applications leak location data in
plain text [7]. In fact, according to Trend Micro, the location
permission was identified as the most abused Android applica-
tion permission.1 This privacy breach was also acknowledged
during the 2018 DEFCON workshops, when applications of
1http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/us/library/image-gallery/
12-most-abused-android-app-permissions
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2both iOS and Android-based devices were detected sending
accurate location data in unencrypted formats.2
In this research, we investigate the phenomenon of location
data leakage in the Internet traffic of Android based smart-
phones. The main goals of this research are as follows:
1) Understanding the amount and quality of location leak-
age detected in plain text in the device’s network traffic.
2) Analyzing the location leaks in order to infer the user’s
POIs. This task is not trivial due to the fact that the
vast majority of the previously proposed POI detection
methods assume a consistent and high rate of location
sampling (e.g., GPS); therefore, they cannot be directly
applied on noisy and sparse location data, such as the
data we focus on in this study (i.e., location data leaked
over mobile device network traffic).
3) Understanding the privacy exposure level of users in
terms of the number of identified POIs, amount of
data required for identifying the POIs, accuracy of the
detected POIs, and time spent in the POIs.
In order to achieve these goals, we collected and analyzed
the Internet traffic of 71 smartphone users for an average of 37
days, while the devices were being used routinely. In addition,
we collected the location of the mobile devices by using a
dedicated Android agent (application) that was installed on the
devices and sampled the location sensor. The data collected by
the agent was used as the ground truth for the actual location
of the mobile device.
In summary the contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) we explore and discuss the scope, volume and quality
of location-based data leaked via insecure, unencrypted
network traffic (i.e., as plaintext) of smart mobile de-
vices.
2) we conduct an empirical evaluation based on real data
from mobile devices.
3) the evaluation involves a unique dataset that was
collected simultaneously from the device itself and
the network traffic sent from the device; such a
dataset from real users’ devices is very difficult to
obtain.3
4) we present a methodological process for collecting,
processing, and filtering location-based data from mobile
devices in order to infer the users’ POIs.
5) to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use
POI clustering on a sparse, inconsistent data stream by
modifying available clustering algorithms, and discuss
the experiments results and the effectiveness of the
applied process.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we summarize previous related work in the domains of data
leakage in mobile devices and inferring points of interest from
location traces. In Section III we describe the assumed threat
model, and in Section IV we present the data collection frame-
work and the data collection process used in this research, as
2https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/09/
dozens-of-ios-apps-surreptitiously-share-user-location-data-with-tracking-firms/
3we currently in the process of getting the required permissions for making
the anonymized dataset publicly available for research.
well as privacy and ethical considerations. Section V contains
our analysis of the location traces extracted from the captured
raw network traffic and Section VI includes an analysis of
inferred points of interest from the leaked location traces. In
Section VII we discuss the challenge of identifying the leaking
application and possible mitigation strategies, and finally, in
Section VIII we conclude with a discussion of the paper’s
contributions and introduce possible directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Data leakage in mobile devices
According to the GDPR definition [8], personal data or
personally identifiable information (PII) is any data that can
be used to identify a person, including name, ID, social media
identity and location. PII leaks are a major privacy concern for
mobile devices users. Along with device and user identifiers,
location leakage is among the private data most commonly
and extensively leaked from mobile devices [7]. Furthermore,
location permission is a very popular permission requested by
most mobile apps (25% of apps use precise location, and an
even greater number of apps use coarse location) [9].
Without accurate knowledge about how each app uses and
handles its location permissions, access of apps to location
API pose a real threat to users’ privacy.
There are several ways to abuse network traffic access in
order to disclose users’ personal information. For example,
one attack model is based on monitoring the network flow
behavior and uses machine learning methods to reveal user
actions, an approach that is effective even if the traffic is
encrypted [10]. Prior research has also shown that by sniffing
the network traffic of well-known and heavily downloaded
apps, an attacker can obtain (leak) a broad spectrum of
personal and device identifying information without the user’s
awareness [11]. The protocol used to transfer PIIs may be
vulnerable to cyber attacks and thus can also be a privacy
breach regardless of user awareness. As a case in point, Ren
et al. [12] presenedt a review on data leakage in mobile apps
by an unsecured HTTP protocol which can be used to identify
the user.
B. Inferring meaningful locations
Inferring meaningful locations from aggregated location
traces is a field of research that has rapidly evolved since
the appearance of cheap mobile GPS devices for civilian use.
These devices, as well as smartphones (in the proper navi-
gation and sampling mode) which have become ubiquitous,
have a high and constant sampling rate; the availability of a
constant data stream is a common assumption for most studies
in location analytics. Inferring meaningful locations relies
upon several major algorithm families: Ester et al. introduced
DBSCAN [13], which is a density-based algorithm for spatial
data, which provides the ability to determine clusters with
undefined shapes and is not bound to a specific number of
clusters, and does not use temporal data as a parameter. Birant
et al. extended DBSCAN into ST-DBSCAN [14], which not
only uses the spatial data of the database points but also
3uses its temporal data which is more suitable for spatio-
temporal data sets. Another approach introduced by Kang et
al. [5] clusters places based on time and distance thresholds
to determine stay points from transit to improve analysis of
trajectories; in the current research we refer to this method
as the ”incremental method.” Kang et al. [5] used predefined
constraints in order to prevent incorrect clustering due to
missing information between traces. Montoliu et al. [15] also
deal with inconsistency and missing data by adding maximum
time constraints between traces’ constraints. Alvares et al. [16]
proposed the use of semantic data to better understand the
meaning of the collected data, and their method can be used
to determine whether a place could be important to the user.
III. THREAT MODEL
Previous research has discussed personal information disclo-
sure and personal information inference from network traffic
leakage. However, those studies mainly dealt with inferring
static information, such as demographic attributes or other PII
which can be observed when the user is connected to a single
malicious hotspot. In our case, since we are analyzing location
data over time in order to obtain contextual information,
capturing network traffic from a single hotspot is insufficient.
Thus, in this paper, it is assumed that a threat actor can
continuously capture the network traffic of the user’s mobile
device. This special capability is granted to the following main
three threat actors:
1) Internet service providers and mobile network op-
erators (MNOs) which are exposed to the vast amount
of the users’ network traffic. The ISP threat model is
strong, however we believe that location data leakage is
a significant problem by itself and therefore should be
explored. In addition, although ISP’s can derive location
information from the cell ID, it is very coarse location.
On the other hand, the location that can be derived from
the leaked data is much more accurate.
2) VPN and proxy servers, which relay mobile device
network traffic to a third party server and can also
misuse the unencrypted data sent in the network traffic.
These solutions are increasingly being used by mobile
users for protecting their privacy or consume restricted
entertainment content [17].4 5
3) Tor-like solutions, which commonly used for protecting
privacy [18]. In this case the location leakage data can
be used by the exit node to expose the real user location
(and maybe the user identity).
The main goal of this study is to estimate the potential
privacy exposure of a user by the such entities if they choose
to misuse this data, or by an attacker.
IV. DATA COLLECTION
In the interest of exploring the extent of location data
leakage in the Internet traffic of Android-based smartphones,
we developed a dedicated data collection framework. Using
4https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/07/10/the-future-of-
the-vpn-market/
5https://blog.globalwebindex.com/chart-of-the-day/vpn-usage/
the framework, we collected data from 71 participants for an
average period of 37 days.
A. Data collection framework
The framework consists of three main components: a VPN
client that collects all of the network traffic transmitted by the
device to the Internet, a dedicated Android agent application
that obtains location readings from the device’s location API,
and a light-weight server.
• VPN client. The high volume of Internet traffic on
smartphones makes it prohibitive to store this information
locally on the device for a long period of time. Alterna-
tively, caching the Internet traffic locally and transmitting
it daily to a remote server causes overheads to the device’s
battery, CPU, and network. In addition, due to security
concerns, such operations require super-user privileges,
which necessitate rooting the user’s device. For these
reasons, we opted to use VPN tunneling to redirect the
traffic through a dedicated VPN server, where we could
record and store the traffic. It should be mentioned that a
VPN is the only user space API provided by the Android
operating system to intercept network traffic that does not
require super-user or system privileges.
• Android agent (client) application. To understand the
quality of location leakage detected in plaintext within
the device’s network traffic and to estimate the privacy
exposure level of users, we developed a dedicated An-
droid application that obtains the actual location of users.
The application uses the network location provider API
which assesses the location by utilizing three sources of
information: GPS, Wi-Fi, and Cell ID (obtained from
the cellular network). The data collected by the agent
application was used as the ground truth for the actual
location of the users. Applying clustering algorithms on
agent-based, accurate and consistent location samples was
shown to be accurate and effective for deriving users’
POIs. Therefore, we opt to use this approach as our
baseline and not to rely on the (subjective) collaboration
of the participants in providing the actual/labeled POIs.
• Light weight server. This server has two primary objec-
tives. First, it operates as an application server, which
communicates with the Android agent application and
stores all location data in a database. Second, it acts as a
VPN server which communicates with the VPN clients,
records all of their network traffic, and redirects it to
the Internet. To provide VPN connectivity and record the
traffic, we created a dedicated LAN (local area network)
on that server where every VPN client was assigned to a
different IP address in the LAN. The Internet traffic was
recorded using ”tshark,” - a network analyzer tool that is
capable of capturing packet data from real-time network
traffic.
B. Experiment
In order to achieve the research objectives, we conducted
an experiment involving 71 participants. The participants were
current and former students at two universities located in
4Fig. 1: The amount of time users participated in the experi-
ment.
Fig. 2: The users’ actual (averaged) location sample rate of
the agent installed on the users’ devices.
two different cities in Israel. Additional information on the
participants:
• 60% are male and 40% female,
• 44% are in the age of 18 to 24 and 56% in the age of 25
to 30,
• 51% are undergraduate students and 49% graduate stu-
dent.
The participants were required to install the two client appli-
cations on their personal mobile device for an average period
of 37 days.
To ensure that the location sampling had minimal impact
on the battery, throughout most of the experiment we set the
Android client to sample the location provider for 60 seconds
every 20 minutes. In addition, the server was deployed on an
AWS (Amazon Web Services) EC2 instance to ensure high
availability.
In Figure 1 we present the amount of time the users
participated in the experiment. In Figure 2 we present the
distribution of the actual location sample rate of the agent
application, as observed in the experiment.
Note that the framework that we developed, and specifically
the VPN and monitoring agent applications that were installed
on the participants smartphones, were used for data collection,
research and validation only and are not assumed to be part
of the threat model.
C. Privacy and ethical considerations
The experiment involved collecting sensitive information
from real subjects for a long period of time. To preserve the
subjects’ privacy, we took the following steps:
1) The subjects participated in the experiments at their own
will and provided their formal consent to participate in
the research; in addition, they were fully aware of the
type of data that would be collected and were allowed
to withdraw from the study at any time. It should be
noted that the subjects received a one-time payment as
compensation for their participation.
2) Anonymization was applied to the data. At the beginning
of the experiment, a random user ID was assigned to
each subject, and this user ID served as the identifier
of the subject, rather than his or her actual identifying
information. The mapping between the experiment’s
user ID and the identity of the subjects was stored in
a hard copy document kept in a safe box; at the end of
the experiment we destroyed this document.
3) During the experiment, the communication between the
agents and servers was fully encrypted. In addition, the
data collected was stored in an encrypted database. At
the end of the experiment the data was transferred to
a local server (i.e., within the institutional network),
which is not connected to the Internet. Only anonymized
information of the subjects was kept for further analysis.
Based on these steps, the research was approved by the
institutional review board (IRB).
V. EXTRACTING LOCATION TRACES FROM RAW
NETWORK TRAFFIC
Location data can be transmitted over network traffic in
many formats including: explicit geolocation coordinates,
names of cities or points of interest, Wi-Fi networks (BSSID),
and cellular network data (Cell ID). In this research we focus
on explicit geolocation data that is transmitted in plaintext;
such structured data can (potentially) provide more accurate
location and is easier to extract and analyze, and thus intro-
duces a greater risk to the user’s privacy if leaked.
A. Process description
In order to automatically detect location traces within the
network traffic of a mobile device, we capture the data at
the IP network layer. Geographic coordinates can be repre-
sented in different formats [19]. We perform regex search of
the standard Android API [20] representation of geographic
coordinates which is decimal degrees in the following format:
XX.YYYYYYY. We specifically used this regular expression
for two main reasons. First, this is the standard format of the
Android location API. Second, our manual exploration of other
location data formats (e.g., names of cities, points of interest,
and Wi-Fi networks) indicated that they can dramatically
increase the number of false positives (for example, city names
sent by a weather forecast application do not indicate the true
location of the user).
Each result is assigned a timestamp based on the packet
capture time. This regular expression may retrieve irrelevant
5results of simple float numbers which have no geographic
meaning and can appear within the network traffic (e.g., the
location of an object on the screen). Therefore, in the next
step we apply the following heuristics in order to filter out
irrelevant results:
• outgoing traffic filter. extracting geographic coordinates
from outgoing traffic (incoming traffic may contain ge-
ographic data that is not relevant to the real location of
the user such as recommendations of POIs and weather
forecasts);
• latitude/longitude pair filter. extracting only pairs of
valid geographic coordinates (i.e., those that were not
already ruled out by the previous filters) that were as-
signed with the same timestamp (they can appear in
different IP packets due to fragmentation); this is because
a coordinate is represented by two values indicating the
latitude and longitude of the location.
• geo-fencing filter. filtering out geographic coordinate that
are outside a predefined geo-fence (e.g., the geographical
boundaries of a given country or city). In our case, all
users were located within the geographical boundaries
of Israel during the data collection period, and therefore
we filtered out all geographic coordinates that are not
within this area (as illustrated in Figure 3). Note that
in order to apply the geo-fencing filter in a general
and practical one can perform reverse geo-coding on the
leaked location data and identify the geographical areas
that are most likely to be relevant to a user or a group of
users. We demonstrat this approach in Figure 4, in which
we performed reverse geo-coding on randomly selected
samples from the leaked location data (1%). As can be
noticed, most of the randomly selected sample are located
within the boundaries of Israel.
B. Analysis and results
In order to evaluate the amount of location data leakage,
we have to determine the accuracy and correctness of the
geographic coordinates detected within the network traffic.
In our experiment we could compare the geographical
coordinates detected within the network traffic with the
location data that was sampled by the agent application
(installed on the participants’ mobile phones). By analyzing
the data collected by the agent application, we observed that
the location was sampled only 70% of the time (see Figure
2 for the distribution of the location sampling rate). Possible
reasons for this are that the device was off, the agent was
shut down, or the location service was disabled.
Following the above observation, we define the active time
of a given user as the number of hours at which the agent
observed at least one location sample. Using the location
samples observed by the agent, we validated the geographic
coordinates that were detected within the network traffic.
Specifically, a location that observed in network traffic was
classified as ’true’ location only if (1) the timestamp of the
detected coordinate was close enough (within 10 minutes)
to a location sampled by the agent application, and (2) the
measured distance between the two coordinates was below a
Fig. 3: The geo-fencing of identified coordinates. Coordinates
that are outside of a predefined geographical area are removed.
Fig. 4: Worldwide distribution of randomly selected geo-
locations found in the network traffic for all of the experiment
participants.
predefined threshold of 250 meters. If just the timestamp of
the detected coordinate was close enough (within 10 minutes)
to a location sampled by the agent application, we labeled
the detected coordinate as ’false’; otherwise, it was labeled
as ’unknown.’
Volume of leaked location data. A total of approximately
474K geolocations (complying with the standard API location
regex) were identified within the network traffic of all of
the monitored mobile devices. After applying the geo-fencing
filter, approximately 347K geolocations remained.
Figure 5 presents the classification of geo-locations de-
tected within the network traffic after applying the lati-
6Fig. 5: The classification of geolocations detected within
the network traffic after applying the latitude/longitude pair
(left column) and after applying both the latitude/longitude
pair and the outgoing traffic filters (right column). Each
column presents the distribution of labels (’true,’ ’false,’ and
’unknown’) of the remaining geo-locations according to the
labeling process described above.
Group Leakage rate Number of devices Percentage
High under 1hr 20 28%
Medium 1-6hrs 19 27%
Low 6+ hrs 23 32%
No leakage ∞ 9 13%
TABLE I: The leakage rate of different mobile devices.
tude/longitude pair filter (left column) and after applying
both the latitude/longitude pair filter and the outgoing traffic
filter (right column). Each column presents the distribution of
labels (’true,’ ’false,’ and ’unknown’) of the remaining geo-
locations according to the labeling process described above.
In total, after applying the latitude/longitude pair filter, 257K
geolocations remained; 36% of them were labeled as ’true,’
47% as ’false,’ and the rest could not be labeled. After
also applying the outgoing traffic filter, 100K geo-locations
remained; 58% of them were labeled as ’true,’ 11% as ’false,’
and the rest could not be labeled.
These results support our hypothesis that incoming traffic
is unlikely to contain relevant geolocations of the mobile
device. We can also see that after applying all three filters,
85% of the geolocations that could be labeled (either as
’true’ or ’false’) indicated the true location of the mobile
device. We can assume that the same rate also exists for the
geolocations that could not be labeled (i.e., ’unknown’).
Rate of data leakage. By analyzing the validated geo-
locations (i.e., labeled as ’true’) of the 71 users, we could see
that the mobile devices of about 90% of them were leaking
location traces. The rate of data leakage of a give user (device)
is calculated by dividing the user’s active time by the number
of validated leaked locations. We partitioned the calculated
leakage rate into the following groups: ’high’, ’medium’, ’low’
and ’no-leakage’ as presented in Table I.
As can be seen in Table I, 55% of the devices were leaking
location data at a medium (once every one to six hours) and
high (once every one hour) rate.
Fig. 6: The coverage rate measure is defined as the total
number of exposed hours of network traffic divided by the
total number of hours of agent application data.
1) Leakage coverage.: We define an exposed hour as an
hour within the collected data (network or agent) in which at
least two valid location leaks were detected.
In order to analyze the coverage over time of relevant (val-
idated) leaked location data, we define the coverage rate
measure as the total number of exposed hours of network
traffic divided by the total number of hours of agent data (i.e.,
excluding hours in which the agent was not active):
CoverageRate =
#ofExposedTrafficHours
#ofAgentDataHours
We assume that a high coverage rate will result in a high
exposure and discovery rates of users’ important places. Figure
6 presents the distribution of the coverage rates of the mobile
devices in the collected dataset. As can be seen, for almost
70% of the users the coverage rate is below 0.2.
2) Leakage inconsistency.: While Table I and Figure 6
present the overall average leakage rate of location data, our
manual exploration of the data showed that the leaked data
exhibits inconsistent, non-uniform, and bursty behavior. As
an example, Figure 7 depicts the number of location samples
per hour of a single user observed by the agent application
(green line) and within the network traffic (red line). It can
be seen that while the agent’s sample rate is relatively stable
(around 12 samples per hour) excluding minor changes (phone
shutdown or agent crash), the leaked location data within the
network traffic is unstable, ranging from only a few or no leaks
to a high rate of leakage.
Thus, in order to analyze and understand the inconsistency
in the amount of leaked location data, we computed the relative
standard deviation measure for each mobile device by dividing
the standard deviation of ’leaks per hour’ by the average
number of ’leaks per hour.’
Figure 8 depicts the distribution of the values of the relative
standard deviation measure of the mobile devices; a value of
zero (0) indicates a constant leakage rate (i.e., zero variability).
VI. INFERRING POINTS OF INTEREST FROM LEAKED
LOCATION TRACES
We are also interested in understanding how we can infer
meaningful insights from the geolocations (coordinates) that
7Fig. 7: An example of a single user, comparing the location
leakage rate obtained by the agent installed on the devices and
the network traffic.
Fig. 8: The leakage rate variability as indicated by the leak
relative standard deviation measure.
were detected as leaks within the mobile devices’ network
traffic. Specifically, we are interested in identifying a user’s
points of interest (POIs) and differentiating them from transit
or noise data [21].
As mentioned in the related work section, the most com-
mon a approach for identifying stay points (or POIs) is by
applying clustering algorithms that are not usually bound
to a predetermined number of clusters (e.g., k-means), and
clustering stay points by spatial or spatio-temporal parameters.
In this research we opted to use three different algorithms:
incremental clustering [5], DBSCAN [6], and ST-DBSCAN
[14]. These algorithms usually have some assumptions on the
data. Specifically, it assumed that the data is arriving at a
constant rate which was not true in our case. Therefore, we
made the following modifications to the algorithms. First, we
included the notion of time by calculating the time between
samples and defined a bound on that time interval. Second,
since we processed long time frames of data, we added a phase
which applies backtracking and use previously created clusters
(i.e., repeating POIs) in order to increase the confidence in the
identified POI.
Another approach uses semantic data to determine when a
user is at an important place; for example, a location trace
at a famous landmark will identify it as an important place
Incremental-
traffic
DBSCAN-
traffic
STDBSCAN-
traffic
Total 282 470 339
True positive 205 213 148
Precision 0.73 0.45 0.43
Recall 0.20 0.20 0.14
TABLE II: Recall and precision measures of the three
methods (Incremental-traffic, DBSCAN-traffic, STDBSCAN-
traffic), when considering the Incremental-agent as the ground
truth of the users’ POIs.
for that user [16]. This approach is not relevant in our case,
because the points of interest are not known in advance;
however, we use semantic data from reverse geocoding to
eliminate transit geolocations (e.g., highways). One of the
main challenges when applying clustering algorithms in fully
unsupervised data is determining the parameters that will yield
the best results. This is even more challenging when the
dataset is not consistent over time and for all users, as shown
in Section V. Based on a manual analysis of the clustering
algorithm results, in our evaluation we set the thresholds
for the incremental clustering algorithms at 500 meters and
30 minutes, and the value of the minPts parameter for the
DBSCAN and STDBSCAN clustering to be at five pts.
Note that we did not have any information about the
users’ real (confirmed) POIs in order to understand the
nature and validity of the POIs identified in the network
traffic leaked locations. Therefore, as a benchmark (and
ground truth) we used the POIs identified by applying
the incremental clustering algorithm on the Android agent
location data (denoted as Incremental-agent). Because the
location traces collect by the mobile agent application
indicate the true location of the user with high accuracy, and
since POIs clustering methods have been proven in previous
work, we found this benchmark sufficient for our purposes.
The POIs identified by applying the different clustering
algorithms on the network traffic’s leaked locations (denoted
as Incremental-traffic, DBSCAN-traffic, and STDBSCAN-
traffic) were compared with the agent-based POIs, namely
the Incremental-agent. We calculated the total amount of time
spent at each user POI and weighed the POI significance
by its part from the user total amount of time spent in all POIs.
POI detection rate. A total of 1,053 POIs (over all users)
were identified by the Incremental-agent method. For each
traffic-based method we calculated: (1) the total number of
POIs identified; (2) the true positive measure (number of POIs
that were also detected by the Incremental-agent method);
(3) the precision (the true positive value divided by the
total number of POIs identified); and (4) the recall (the true
positive value divided by the number of POIs identified by
the benchmark method, i.e., Incremental-agent). The results
are presented in Table II. As can be seen, the recall, which
represents the POI discovery rate, is approximately 20% for all
methods; the Incremental-traffic method yields the best results,
compared to the other methods, with slightly lower recall but
much higher precision.
In a real-life scenario, the adversary will not be able to label
8Incremental- traffic
(all)
Incremental-traffic
(’true’ only)
Precision 0.73 0.94
Recall 0.20 0.20
TABLE III: The recall and precision of the Incremental-traffic
method when applied on all identified geolocations and when
applied only on the confirmed (’true’) geolocations.
Incremental-
traffic
DBSCAN-
traffic
STDBSCAN-
traffic
Total 263 374 264
True positive 193 201 141
Precision 0.73 0.54 0.53
Recall 0.20 0.20 0.14
TABLE IV: The recall and precision measures of the three
methods (Incremental-traffic, DBSCAN-traffic, STDBSCAN-
traffic), when considering the Incremental-agent as the ground
truth of the users’ POIs and when using semantic information.
the extracted geolocations as ’true,’ ’false,’ or ’unknown’ (as
described in Section V). Therefore, in Table II we applied the
clustering algorithm on all the geolocations.
In Table III we present the optimal results that the adversary
can achieve when the POI identification process is only applied
on the users’ ’true’ geolocations. In this case, it can be
seen that the Incremental-traffic clustering method achieved
a similar recall of 20%, however the precision improved
dramatically to 95%.
Previous work on location data analysis showed that
prior semantic information (e.g., landmarks, shopping centers,
roads, etc.) can be used in order to determine if a location
trace is a user’s POI or transit location [22]. Thus, in order
to further improve the POI inference process, we used prior
semantic information in order better determine the real POIs.
Specifically, we used Google’s reverse geo-coding API in
order to remove geo-location clusters (i.e., POIs) that are
located on highways.
Table IV presents the results of detected POIs (true positive,
precision, and recall) when using this semantic information.
As can be seen, using semantic information to eliminate
irrelevant location clusters can improve the precision with no
effect on the recall. This can be explained by the fact that
due to the lower and inconsistent location leakage within the
network traffic, the irrelevant location clusters (i.e., highways)
are poorly reflected within the network traffic but better
captured by the agent.
The importance of the 25% identified POIs. The number
of identified POIs alone does not necessarily provide a good
estimation for the exposure rate of users’ whereabouts. For
example, let’s assume a user with ten different significant
locations (POIs). If a user spends 50% of his/her time at home
and is at work 35% of the time, by determining the user’s
home and work locations, we are able to identify the locations
at which the user spends 85% of his/her time (although we
identified only 20% of the user’s POIs).
Thus, in order to estimate the significance of the identified
locations (POIs), we computed a weighted measure for the POI
Leakage rate POI discovery ra-
tio
Weighted POI
discovery ratio
High rate (under 1hr) 48% 81%
Medium rate (1-6hr) 26% 67%
Low rate (6+hr) 8% 37%
No leakage 0 0
Total 27% 61%
TABLE V: The POI and weighted POI discovery ratios of
the Incremental-traffic method. The POI discovery rate is
the number of places found in the network data divided
by the number of places found by the benchmark method
(Incremental-agent). The weighted POI discovery rate is the
amount of time spent at the identified POIs out of the total
user time.
Dependent variable:
Weighted POI’s exposure rate
Coverage 0.559∗∗∗
(0.172)
Leak rate −0.0000013∗∗
(0.00000)
Relative standard deviation −0.048
(0.078)
Constant 0.597∗∗∗
(0.106)
R2 0.315
Adjusted R2 0.283
Residual Std. Error 0.331 (df = 65)
F Statistic 9.955∗∗∗ (df = 3; 65)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
TABLE VI: The linear regression model for estimating POIs’
exposure rate from network traffic measures.
detection rate as follows. For each POI detected we computed
the relative time spent by the user at that location (i.e., the
total time that the user was at the POI divided by the total
time the user spent at all POIs). The weighted measure of
the POIs was computed from the baseline Incremental-agent
method. Then, the POI discovery rate measure was computed
by using the weights computed for each identified POI.
The results presented in Table V show a high weighted POI
discovery ratio for the medium and high leakage rates, and
total of 61% weighted POI’s exposure rate.
Inferring the potential exposure rate of POIs from
network traffic leakage measures. In a real-life scenario an
attacker would not have a benchmark to relate to and inferring
a user’s POI exposure rate would be based on captured data
alone. By deriving a regression model (Table VI) we can
see that the user weighted POI exposure ratio parameter
has a high correlation with the leakage rate and coverage
rate measures and no significant correlation with the relative
standard deviation.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss two interesting questions that arise
from our research: (1) how to identify which are the leaking
9apps, and, (2) how can users reduce the location leakage
privacy risk.
A. Identifying leaking applications and services
The goal of our analysis in this section is to determine which
applications are responsible for leaking the location data and
whether the leakage occurs as a result of intentional misuse
or a benign application sending location data in plaintext.
One approach for obtaining such information is real-time
on device monitoring of the installed applications’ outgoing
traffic. However, as mentioned in Section IV-A, due to security
concerns such operations require super-user privileges which
necessitate rooting the user’s device, and therefore, such an
approach was not an option in our experiment.
Deriving the information about the leaking applications
from the network traffic captured is also challenging for three
main reasons: (1) the network traffic captured does not provide
an explicit indication of the sending application/service, (2) be-
cause of the growing use of cloud services and content delivery
networks (CDNs), many destination IPs are hosted by services
such as AWS, Akamai or Google, and (3) location data can
be sent to advertisement and intelligence service domains by
components embedded in multiple Android applications.
Given this, we opted to analyze the destination host names
observed within the HTTP traffic. We focused specifically
on outgoing traffic containing location leaks. By extracting
the host names from the HTTP requests that contained the
leaked location data we identified 112 different services. Then,
we analyzed the host names using public security services
(VirusTotal), search engines (Google and Whois) and security
reports. Based on the analysis results, we were able to classify
each host name by its reported usage (e.g., weather fore-
cast, navigation, location analytics, advertisement service) and
whether it appears to be a legitimate or unwanted/suspicious
service. Services with clear/reasonable location usage and no
reported security issues were classified as ’benign’; the rest of
the services were classified as ’suspicious’.
Figure 9 presents the top 12 host names classified by their
category (color) and level of suspiciousness (size of circle).
Each host name is placed on the graph according to the average
number of detected leakage events (x-axis) and the number of
users involved in the experiments sending location data to that
host name (y-axis).
Some of the suspicious domain names include sam-
sungbuiasr.vlingo.com which was previously published as a
Samsung pre-installed speech recognition application named
Vlingo. This application was found to be leaking sensi-
tive information. Another example includes the domains,
n129.epom.com and mediation.adnxs.com, which are reported
to provide personalized advertisements. An additional sig-
nificant suspicious domain is app.woorlds.com, which was
reported to be a location analytics service. Interestingly, our
analysis concludes that the Google Maps JavaScript API
(maps.googleapis.com), which lets Android application devel-
opers customize maps with user locations, is also responsible
for sending location data in plaintext. This is particularly
noteworthy since Google recommends that application devel-
opers use the secured Maps JavaScript API (which operates
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Fig. 9: Presenting the top 12 host names classified by their
category (color) and benign/suspicious (size of circle) The x-
axis represents the average number of detected leakage events,
and the y-axis represents the number of users involved in the
experiments sending location data to that host name.
over HTTPS) whenever possible.6 Nonetheless, our analysis
shows that in practice, developers also use the unsecured Map
JavaScript API (which operates over HTTP). Overall, based on
the analyzed data, we found that the set of unwanted services
is responsible for more than 60% of location leakage events.
Another interesting observation from our analysis is that
although the number of location data leakage events (x-axis
in Figure 9) for each individual host name is not high, based
on the analysis in Section VI we were still able identify the
users’ significant POIs from the data. We attribute that finding
to the fact that there are multiple applications installed on each
individual smartphone, which together leak a sufficient amount
of information that can be analyzed in order to infer the POIs.
Although the identity of the leaking application is not ex-
plicitly indicated in the network traffic, we performed further
analysis in an attempt to link the identified host names with
the applications installed on the users’ mobile devices. In
order to do so, we first extracted (using our Android agent)
the set of all applications that are installed on the mobile
devices of the users which require both location and network
permissions. Next, we computed a modified tf-idf measure
for each pair consisting of an application and host name. tf-idf
is a well-known measure in the field of text categorization,
which is often used as a weighting factor in information
retrieval and text mining [23]. The acronym tf-idf is short for
term frequency-inverse document frequency. It is a numerical
statistic intended to reflect how important a term (i.e., word)
is to a document in a collection or corpus. The tf-idf value
increases proportionally to the number of times a term appears
in the document, but it is offset by the frequency of the term in
the corpus, which helps to adjust for the fact that some terms
appear more frequently in general. In our case, a document is
a host name, and a term is an application. The term frequency
6https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/javascript/tutorial
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(denoted by TF ) of an application (denoted by a) with respect
to a given host name (denoted by h) is calculated as follows:
TFh(a) =
|Uah |
|Uh|
where Uh represents the set of users for which we identify a
location leakage (from their devices to h), and Uah represents
the subset of users from Uh in which application a was
installed on the devices.
The inverse document frequency (denoted by IDF ) of an
application is calculated as follows:
IDF (a) = −log10
( |Ua|
|U |
)
where Ua represents the set of users for which application a
was installed on the devices; and U represents the set of all
users.
Given the above, the tf-idf of an application with respect to
a given host name is calculated as follows:
TFIDFh(a) = TFh(a) ∗max
(
1, IDF (a)
)
The reason for limiting the inverse document frequency (IDF )
value to one is to prevent rare applications from achieving
a very high tf-idf score and consequently be mistakenly
linked with the host name. In addition, we applied min-max
normalization to the tf-idf scores of applications in order to
keep them within the range of zero and one. A high TF value
for an application a with respect to a host h indicates that a
was frequently observed in devices that transmit location data
in plaintext to h. On the other hand, a high IDF value for a
indicates that a was not frequently observed on the devices in
general. Thus, a high tf-idf score for application a with respect
to host h may indicate that a is related to the location leakage
to h.
The results of this analysis are presented in Figure
10, where the tf-idf values are shown for each host
name (x-axis) and application (y-axis). Based on these re-
sults we can classify the applications into two categories.
The first category includes applications that send the lo-
cation data to their own hosting service. In this cate-
gory we can find multiple HTC, LG, and Samsung pre-
installed applications found to be related to their own host-
ing services (htc2.accu-weather.com, lgemobilewidget.accu-
weather.com, and samsungbuiasr.vlingo.com), as well as the
GetTaxi (com.gettaxi.android) and Easy (easy.co.il.easy3) ap-
plications which were found to be related to their hosting
services (location.gtforge.com and easy.co.il respectively).
The second category includes applications that send (usually
via integrated ”software plug-ins”) location data to third party
services such as advertisement APIs (n129.epom.com) or
analytical services (app.woorlds). In this category we identified
a popular student application named com.mobixon.istudent.
We also identified applications that send location data to
Google Maps services (for presenting objects on maps), some
of which potentially use the Google Maps JavaScript API in an
unsecured manner (the HTTP protocol instead of the HTTPS
protocol).
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Fig. 10: Presenting the tf-idf values are presented for each host
name (x-axis) and application (y-axis).
B. Mitigation strategies: reducing the privacy risk
In order to reduce the privacy risk of location leakage and
POI inference presented in our paper, the following counter-
measures are suggested and could be further investigated and
developed in future work.
• Awareness. The most basic approach is increasing the
awareness of mobile device users to such risks and pro-
viding them with the tools and means to reduce the risk
[24]. For example, reducing the risk can be achieved by
installing only trusted applications (from trusted sources),
monitoring and limiting sensitive permissions such as lo-
cation and Internet access, and disabling location service
on the device while not in use and turning it on only on
demand.
• OS policy and tools. The Android OS provides built-in
standard security solutions features such as isolation, en-
cryption, memory management, and user-granted permis-
sions for phone resources and sensors. Once permission
has been granted by the user, PII handling is done solely
by best practice recommendation [25]. This may include
enforcing encryption on applications that send sensitive
information such as location over the Internet or applying
a tool such as PrivacyGuard [26]. In addition, future
versions of the Android OS could consider improving
privacy by enabling user decisions regarding background
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operation involving sensitive data.
• Monitoring. Monitoring network traffic by third party
security providers in order to detect PII leaks was pro-
posed by [7] and is a useful approach for identifying
applications that misuse users’ private information.
• PII obfuscation. An application installed on the mobile
device that monitors the location sampling or location
leakage over the network traffic can intelligently inject
spoofed locations that can make it difficult for a threat
actor to infer the true POIs of the user.
Since the experimental setup of this research was complex
and resource and time consuming, we opted leave the design,
development and evaluation of the defense approaches, es-
pecially applying PII obfuscation as an adversarial learning
approach on the clustering algorithms [27], to future research.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we showed the extent of location leakage from
mobile devices and presented a systematic process of extract-
ing location traces from raw network traffic. We analyzed the
results of three different geo-clustering methods applied over
the inconsistent network traffic data and showed that existing
algorithms yield good results, even with inconsistent location
data; this makes any user location privacy vulnerable even
with a low rate of location leakage. Our work enables location
exposure assessment by monitoring network traffic and reveals
that even relatively low location leakage rates (e.g., six hours)
and coverage of only 20% can expose more than 70% of the
weighted POIs. In future work we plan to further automate
the POI identification process by automatically setting up the
clustering algorithm parameters; evaluate the extent to which
the leaked data can be used for predicting the users future
location; and develop a mitigation approach based on adver-
sarial learning techniques, which will be based on injecting a
minimal number of false locations in clear text to the network
traffic, in order to deceive the clustering algorithms (i.e., PII
obfuscation).
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